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TRANSFINITELY TRANSITIVE VALUE
By Kacper Kowalczyk1,2
This paper develops transfinite extensions of transitivity and acyclicity in the context of population ethics.
They are used to argue that it is better to add good lives, worse to add bad lives, and equally good to add
neutral lives, where a life’s value is understood as personal value. These conclusions rule out a number
of theories of population ethics, feed into an argument for the repugnant conclusion, and allow us to
reduce different-number comparisons to same-number ones. Challenges to these arguments are addressed,
including the issue of comparing existence and non-existence in terms of personal value, the possibility
of minimal quanta of time and life, and the meaningfulness of measuring closeness between outcomes
with different population sizes. An asymmetry is uncovered between transfinite cycles of worseness and
betterness, supporting a version of the weak procreative asymmetry. Transfinite transitivity principles
are also favourably compared to the better-known principles of continuity.




Transitivity of Weak Betterness. For all value-bearers X, Y, Z, if X is at least as
good as Y and Y is at least as good as Z, then X is at least as good as Z.
Here is one way to appreciate the meaning of this principle. Take a sequence
X 1, X 2, . . . such that X 1 is at least as good as X 2, which in turn is at least as
good as X 3, which . . . and so on. If X comes at the end of such a sequence,
transitivity allows us to make a shortcut: we can conclude that X 1 is at least
as good as X. Provided that the sequence is finite, that is. Transfinite transitivity
relaxes this finiteness proviso, allowing us to make infinite as well as finite
shortcuts. What this means exactly will be explained in the next section.
Principles of transitivity are powerful, as evidenced by Parfit’s mere addition
paradox (1987 [1984]: 419–41), Broome’s argument against the neutrality in-
tuition (2004: 140–50), and Temkin’s (1996) spectra arguments. Rachels (2001)
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and Temkin (1996, 2012) take these unexpected results to cast doubt on tran-
sitivity itself.
Principles of transfinite transitivity are much more powerful than that. This
paper will show how to use them to argue that creating people with good lives
is better than not creating them and that creating people with bad lives is
worse than not creating them, thus significantly narrowing down the range of
possible views in population ethics.
Why believe transfinite transitivity? In my other work, I argue that major
arguments in favour of transitivity can also be used to support transfinite
transitivity. Its central part concerns transfinite transitivity’s role in the theory of
rational choice. In an important range of infinite decision problems, transfinite
transitivity can play the same role that transitivity plays in finite decision
problems: it helps secure the existence of best options, it can be characterized
by consistency conditions on permissible choice, and it can be supported by
money-pump arguments. This suggests transfinite transitivity truly generalizes
transitivity.1
Section II explains transfinite transitivity and related principles in more
detail. Section III shows how to use them in population ethics. Section IV
then takes up some objections and loose ends regarding these arguments.
Section V is about how pragmatic (money-pump) arguments bear on the
status of these transfinite principles in the context of population ethics. This
discussion suggests a novel justification of a version of the so-called procreative
asymmetry. Section VI compares transfinite transitivity to a related but better-
known principle of continuity, showing how the former is importantly more
liberal.
II. PRINCIPLES
Transitivity can be generalized into the transfinite whenever our domain of
evaluation is equipped with a notion of convergence which is perhaps easiest to
explain in terms of closeness (or distance). We say that the sequence X 1, X 2, . . .
converges to X (its limit) iff it eventually becomes arbitrarily close to X. For
example, the sequence of numbers 1, 12 ,
1
4 , . . . converges to number 0, since
the absolute difference between members of that sequence and 0 is eventually
arbitrarily small.2 How to understand closeness in the case of value-bearers
will depend on the application at issue, and we will see some examples below.
1 See Kowalczyk (ms). Broome (2004: 50–63) provides a different argument for ordinary
transitivity, namely, that it is part of the logic of comparatives. I think a similar argument might
well work to support transfinite transitivity, too, the key insight being that the natural ordering
of the real line is transfinitely transitive with respect to its usual topology.
2 More precisely, for any positive number ε, all elements sufficiently far in the sequence are
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With convergence in hand, we can build towards transfinite transitivity of
weak betterness by noting that ordinary transitivity of weak betterness allows
us to make shortcuts along finite paths of weak betterness, as follows:3
X 1  X 2  X 3 implies X 1  X 3.
X 1  X 2  X 3  X 4 implies X 1  X 4.
X 1  X 2  X 3  X 4  X 5 implies X 1  X 5.
And so on.
Here all X 1, X 2, . . . are value-bearers. Transfinite transitivity of weak
betterness extends this pattern into the transfinite, by means of the notion of
convergence: for all value-bearers X , X 1, X 2, . . .,
X 1  X 2  X 3  . . . → X implies X 1  X ,
where ‘→’ indicates convergence.4 Put differently:
Transfinite Transitivity of Weak Betterness. For all value-bearers X , X 1, X 2, . . .,
if the sequence X 1, X 2, . . . converges to X, and X 1 is at least as good as X 2, X 2 is at least
as good as X 3, . . . , then X 1 is at least as good as X.5
Analogously, we can define transfinite transitivity of other binary relations
such as strict betterness, strict worseness, weak worseness, or equal goodness.
Principles from the finite case that are weaker than transitivity can also be
generalized into the transfinite. For example, we have
Acyclicity of Weak Betterness. For all value-bearers X 1, X 2, . . . , X n , if X 1 is at least
as good as X 2, X 2 is at least as good as X 3, . . . , and X n−1 is at least as good as X n , then
X n is not better than X 1.6
where some distance metric is defined. For more explanation of all mathematical concepts in
this paper, see a standard topology textbook such as Mendelson (1962).
3 Notation: ‘’ will mean ‘at least as good as’, ‘’ ‘better than’, ‘≺’ ‘worse than’, ‘’ ‘at least
as bad as’, and ‘∼’ will mean ‘equally good as’. I will call these relations ‘weak betterness’, ‘strict
betterness’, ‘strict worseness’, ‘weak worseness’, and ‘equal goodness’, respectively.
4 This notation is from Bartha, Barker & Hájek (2014) who also introduce the name ‘transfinite
transitivity’ for what I would call ‘transfinite acyclicity of strict worseness’. The idea of transfinite
transitivity itself is apparently due to Gillies (1959). It was then reinvented by Smith (1974) and
discussed by Birchenhall (1977), Mukherji (1977), and later by Carosi & Zaffaroni (1999) and
Kukushkin (2008). In philosophy it was reinvented again by Bartha et al. (2014). None of these
authors have applied transfinite transitivity in ethics, let alone population ethics.
5 It is easy to see that reflexivity plus transfinite transitivity of weak betterness implies tran-
sitivity of weak betterness: if X  Y  Z , then X  Y  Z  Z  . . . → Z , so, by transfinite
transitivity, X  Z .











Transfinite Acyclicity of Weak Betterness. For all value-bearers
X , X 1, X 2, . . . , X n , if the sequence X 1, X 2, . . . converges to X, and X 1 is at
least as good as X 2, X 2 is at least as good as X 3, . . . , then X is not better than X 1.
These definitions work for other binary relations, too. Transfinite transitivity
of weak betterness expresses the thought that whenever things are getting
worse, in the limit they must be the worst, while transfinite acyclicity of weak
betterness expresses the logically weaker thought that whenever things are
getting worse, they cannot be better in the limit.
To be clear, these transfinite principles differ from their finite namesakes
in that they require some notion of convergence, here understood in terms of
closeness (or distance). Whether the principles are appealing or even meaning-
ful depends on that further choice. But, in many cases, we do have an intuitive
grasp of convergence.
III. ARGUMENTS
What is the value of adding an extra life? In a sense that is the basic question
of population ethics. Transfinite transitivity principles can help us answer it.
III.1 Constant additions
First consider adding a life that is constantly neutral, in the sense that it is equally
good no matter how long it is. If we graphed the cumulative value of such a life
against time, that is, the value it would have if it ended at any given time,
we would get a flat line. The slope of that graph, the extra cumulative value
divided by the time already lived, would always be zero.7
To take a specific example, suppose that Zeno is added to some antecedent
outcome A with a constantly neutral life 𝓃 of 80 years. And then his lifespan is
repeatedly halved, as in Table 1, where the dash indicates Zeno’s non-existence.
Table 1. Shortening Zeno’s lifespan
Zeno People in A
A1 Life 𝓃 Unaffected
A2 Life 𝓃 cut short at 40 years Unaffected
A3 Life 𝓃 cut short at 20 years Unaffected
. . . . . . . . .
A — Unaffected
7 Compare Broome (2004: 68) and Brown (ms). In the end, on page 254, Broome defines
‘constantly neutral’ in a way which presupposes the coherence of temporal welfare, which my
definition does not. And on pages 23–4 he also assumes discrete rather than continuous time.
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Zeno’s life 𝓃 is just as good when it is lived in full as it is when cut short at
40 years, and just as good then as it is when cut short at 20 years, and so on.
Hence, each outcome is just as good for Zeno as the next. Since others are
unaffected, it is therefore plausible that each outcome is just as good as the
next. This follows from
Pareto Indifference. If the same people exist in outcomes X and Y, and everyone is
equally well off in X as they are in Y, then X and Y are equally good.
It is also plausible that the sequence of outcomes A1, A2, . . . converges to
outcome A. That is, the sequence of outcomes where Zeno’s life is getting
shorter and shorter converges to an outcome where Zeno does not exist at all.
Why? First, the region of the spatiotemporal difference between A and
members of the sequence is getting smaller and smaller. For i large enough, A i
differs from A only for a fraction of a second. Moreover, the difference does
not ‘blow up’ as it gets smaller and smaller spatiotemporally. The difference
between A i and A is the same as that between A1 and A, except more localized.
To make the claim of convergence even more plausible we can assume that
Zeno’s life 𝓃 is open on the left, so that there is no first moment of time when it
is lived. It is therefore like the left-open interval, (0, 1], containing all numbers
between zero and one, excluding zero, as opposed to a left-closed interval like
[0, 1], which also contains zero. Hence, if Zeno’s life 𝓃 were shortened to zero
length, it arguably could not become a point-sized zero-length life, but would
have to instead disappear altogether.
We can also think of A1, A2, . . . as the outcomes of successive finite stages
of a supertask, a situation where infinitely many actions are performed in finite
time, with A being the outcome at the ω-th stage, coming after all the finite
stages. For example, compare Zeno’s predicament with a version of Benardete’s
(1964: 259–60) ‘paradox of the gods’ where a traveller wants to go from point
0 to point 1 but an infinity of impenetrable walls of decreasing thickness is put
up in between, with the first wall halfway, at point 12 , then halfway between 0
and 12 , at point
1
4 , and so on.
8 The traveller therefore has to stay put at point
0. Similarly, if, say, we progressively tweaked Zeno’s genes to make him more
and more short-lived, his career would never get started.9
8 This version is discussed by Peijnenburg & Atkinson (2010). Unlike Benardete’s original—
discussed by Priest (1999) and Yablo (2000)—this one is unparadoxical, as Peijnenburg and
Atkinson also show.
9 I think both considerations of overall physical similarity and supertasks give us a handle
on the notion of convergence. The latter might actually depend on the former. To determine
what would happen at the ω-th stage of supertasks, authors such as Allis & Koetsier (1995) and
Earman & Norton (1996) appeal to principles of physical continuity, thus presupposing physical
convergence. Recent discussion of convergence and closeness in physics can be found in Fletcher
(2020). If physics is too contingent for value theory, we might take inspiration from Lewis (1983)
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Someone could object that outcomes which differ in the number of people
in existence are always some fixed distance apart (and, so, no convergence
could obtain between them). But this objection not only goes against the
considerations of overall physical similarity and supertasks just mentioned, but
also seems to implausibly presuppose that the number of people corresponds
to an independent dimension of closeness.
Granting the claim of convergence, Pareto indifference and the assumption
that Zeno’s life 𝓃 is constantly neutral imply the following pattern:
A1 ∼ A2 ∼ . . . → A .
Hence, by transfinite transitivity of equal goodness:
A1 ∼ A .
Since we assumed nothing special about Zeno or about other people in A,
we can conclude, in general, that adding any constantly neutral and left-open
life to any outcome is equally good as not adding it.10
We can immediately lift the restriction to left-open lives by using ordinary
transitivity and Pareto indifference plus the extra assumption that someone
could have a constantly neutral and left-open life.11 That extra assumption is
plausible enough. If time really is a continuum, why cannot someone’s life
occupy a temporal region open on the left?12
To see how the argument goes from there, consider Table 2.
Table 2. Left-closed additions
Zeno People in A
A — Unaffected
B Life 𝓃, left-open Unaffected
C Life 𝓃, left-closed Unaffected
10 Transfinite acyclicity of equal goodness gives a correspondingly weaker claim that the out-
come of adding a constantly neutral life is neither better nor worse than the outcome of not
adding it.
11 This makes my argument unlike otherwise similar arguments in Bader (forthcoming, ms-a).
Other differences include that Bader does not use constantly neutral lives, nowhere appeals to
transfinite transitivity/acyclicity, and mostly works directly with permissible choice rather than
value. Nonetheless, this paper would not have existed without the inspiration of Bader’s earlier
work.
12 While plausible enough, it is part of an ancient debate about the boundaries of ordinary
objects in continuous space; see Varzi (2015). Suffice to say, I have Leonardo da Vinci and
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Think of outcome A as status quo. Zeno can then be added with a con-
stantly neutral life 𝓃 which will be left-open in outcome B and left-closed in
outcome C.
First, if the argument above goes through for left-open lives, then A and
B are equally good. The second step begins by noting that B and C are also
equally good for Zeno. His life is longer by an instant in the latter outcome,
but that should not matter since it is constantly neutral either way. And since
other people are unaffected, it follows from Pareto indifference that B and C
are equally good.
A stronger claim seems true as well: if someone’s life in two outcomes is
identical except that it is left-open in one and left-closed in the other, then both
outcomes are equally good for that person. By analogy, recall that, in calculus,
the area under a curve between two bounds a and b is the same whether or
not the bounds themselves are included: a strip of no width can add nothing
to total area.
Hence, A and B are equally good, and B and C are equally good. So, by
transitivity of equal goodness, A and C are equally good. It does not matter
whether a constantly neutral life is left-open or not. In general, we get
The Constant Addition Principle. If outcomes X and Y differ only in that there is
one extra person in Y living a constantly neutral life, then Y is equally good as X.
We can run direct arguments for similar principles on the negative and the
positive sides.13 For the former, consider adding a life which is constantly bad in
the sense that it is worse the longer it is. If we graphed its cumulative value
against time, we would get a downward-sloping curve. We can then imagine
adding Zeno with such a life to outcome A and then repeatedly halving his
lifespan. That each outcome in the resulting sequence is better than the last
follows from a strengthening of Pareto indifference,
Strong Pareto. If the same people exist in outcomes X and Y, and everyone is at least
as well off in X as they are in Y, then X is at least as good as Y, and if, in addition, some
are better off in X than they are in Y, then X is better than Y.
Then the relevant claim of convergence and transfinite transitivity of strict
worseness imply that adding Zeno with a constantly bad life is worse than not
adding him.
On the positive side, the argument is similar. We make Zeno’s life constantly
good, so that it is better the longer it is. It then follows, this time using transfinite
13 This matters since transfinite transitivity of equal goodness (much like ordinary transitivity of
equal goodness) is not easily supported by its role in rational choice theory (where strict value
relations matter more). Moreover, transitivity of indifference (the preferential counterpart of
equal goodness) was historically the most readily rejected form of transitivity, for example, by
Armstrong (1948: 3): ‘That indifference is not transitive is indisputable, and a world in which it
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transitivity of strict betterness, that adding Zeno with such a life is better than
not adding him. In either case the implicit restriction to left-open lives is easily
removed as before.
We therefore obtain positive and negative versions of the constant addi-
tion principle, with ‘constantly neutral’ and ‘equally good as’ replaced by
‘constantly good’ and ‘better than’, and ‘constantly bad’ and ‘worse than’,
respectively.
III.2 Mere additions
These principles tell us something about adding lives with a uniform trajectory
through time, constant additions, as it were. What do they imply about other mere
additions?
We can use the special status of constantly neutral lives to answer this
question. Say we are wondering whether it is better to add Zeno with some
life 𝓁 to outcome A, as in Table 3.
Table 3. Mere additions
Zeno People in A
A — Unaffected
B Life 𝓃 Unaffected
C Life 𝓁 Unaffected
That is, we are wondering whether C is better than A. To find out, it is
enough to compare life 𝓁 with life 𝓃, a constantly neutral one. If 𝓁 is better
than 𝓃, then it follows, by strong Pareto, that C is better than B. Since, by
the constant addition principle, B is equally good as A, it follows, by ordinary
transitivity, that C is better than A. So, in general, it is always better to add a
life that is better than some constantly neutral life. We can put this by saying
that lives better than some constantly neutral life have positive contributive value.
Analogously we can also show that lives worse than (just as good as) some
constantly neutral life have negative (zero) contributive value.
In fact, a comparison with a constantly neutral life is not only sufficient but
also necessary to determine a life’s contributive value. Suppose, for example,
that it is better to add Zeno with 𝓁 to A. That is, C is better than A. Since, by
the constant addition principle, A is equally good as B, it follows by ordinary
transitivity that C is better than B. But note that these two differ only in that
Zeno has life 𝓁 in the former and life𝓃 in the latter. Since no one else is affected,
it is plausible to think that 𝓁 must therefore be better than 𝓃.14 It would then
14 There are two ways this can be argued. First, if 𝓃 is at least as good as 𝓁, then it follows,
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follow that if a life has positive contributive value, it must be better than a
constantly neutral life. Analogously we can show that lives with negative (zero)
contributive value are worse than (just as good as) some constantly neutral
life.15
If we accept both directions of this argument, we see that constantly neu-
tral lives neatly divide all possible lives in terms of their contributive value.
In this way we know the status of all mere additions, not just constant
additions.16
III.3 Implications for population ethics
Note that, so far, we did not have to assume that welfare can be numerically
measured in any fine-grained manner, and we assumed nothing about what it
takes for a life to be worth living or worth not living.
By contrast, theories and principles in population ethics typically assume
something about both. First, they typically assume that welfare is interperson-
ally measurable on a ratio scale where, second, zero corresponds to the welfare
level of a life which is neutral in terms of personal value: on the boundary be-
tween worth living and worth not living.
Let’s now make these assumptions, too, to see the implications of my argu-
ments for standard claims and theories in population ethics. In this framework,
the key question becomes ‘What is the welfare level of constantly neutral lives?’
Given the argument so far, it is tempting to accept what Brown (ms) would
call:
The Flatline Analysis of Neutrality. A life is neutral iff it is just as good as a
constantly neutral life.
Brown (ms) is sympathetic to this analysis and does much to defend it. Broome
(2004: 68) suggests a similar analysis, too. Accepting it allows us to relate the
conclusions reached so far with well-known theses in population ethics.
First, we get the nicely harmonious principle:
The Equivalence of Personal and Contributive Value. The sign of a life’s con-
tributive value is equal to the sign of its welfare.17
Hence, 𝓁 is either better than 𝓃 or incomparable with it. We can rule out the latter possibility by
assuming that all lives are comparable in personal value. Secondly, we can use a same-number
independence principle (as in Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson 2005: 159) without assuming
comparability.
15 This claim is compatible with some lives being incomparable with constantly neutral ones,
as suggested by Gustafsson (2020). These lives would then have undefined contributive value: adding
them would be incomparable with not adding them.
16 The arguments of this subsection and the last also imply that all constantly neutral
lives are equally good, worse than constantly good lives, and better than constantly bad
lives.
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This principle rules out theories for which the two signs can differ.18 One
example is
Average Utilitarianism. Outcome X is at least as good as outcome Y iff average
welfare in X is at least as high as average welfare in Y.
This is because if the average welfare of an antecedent population is negative
enough, adding an extra life with negative welfare might increase the average.19
Another example is
Critical-Level Utilitarianism. Outcome X is at least as good as outcome Y iff total
welfare in X is at least as high as in Y after positive constant α, the critical-level parameter,
was subtracted from each person’s welfare in both X and Y.20
Hence, a life might have positive welfare but contribute negatively to the value
of the outcome if it happens to be below α.21
Another upshot is that we can quickly get to
The Repugnant Conclusion. For any outcome in which many people exist, at a high
welfare level, there is a better outcome in which many more people exist, at a barely
positive welfare level.22
To see this, start with some outcome A where many people exist at a high
welfare level. Keep adding constantly neutral lives until we get an outcome, say,
B, where average welfare is barely positive. By the constant addition principle,
each such addition preserves overall value. Hence, by ordinary transitivity, all
of them do. So, B is equally good as A. Let Z be an outcome which is like B
except that total welfare is slightly higher and equally distributed but where
everyone’s welfare is still barely positive. That Z is better than B follows from
Non-Anti-Egalitarianism. If the same people exist in outcomes X and Y, and out-
come X has higher total welfare, higher average welfare, and is more equal than outcome
Y, then X is better than Y.23
Hence, Z is better than B, B is equally good as A, so, by transitivity, Z is better
than A. This is the repugnant conclusion.24
18 If we used transfinite acyclicity principles instead of transfinite transitivity principles, we would
get the weaker claim that the sign of a life’s contributive value is not distinct from the sign of its
welfare, which allows for, say, a positive-welfare life with undefined contributive value.
19 Compare Parfit’s (1987 [1984]: 422) Hell Three.
20 Compare Broome (2004: 255) and Blackorby et al. (2005: 137–8).
21 This leads to the sadistic conclusion of Arrhenius (2000: 251).
22 Compare Parfit (1987 [1984]: 388).
23 See Ng (1989: 238).
24 This argument is similar to Parfit’s (1987 [1984]: 419–41) mere addition paradox. We can
see that claims about convergence, transfinite transitivity principles, and Pareto principles can
together replace Parfit’s mere addition principle, given the flatline analysis of neutrality. This is
how the current paper’s argument can be read as an impossibility theorem, contributing to the
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Table 4. Different-number comparisons
Zeno Zelda Xenon
A 10 — —
B 5 5 5
C 10 w (𝓃) w (𝓃)
In fact, once welfare is interpersonally measurable on a ratio scale, we can
draw some important conclusions even without assuming the flatline analysis
of neutrality.
The argument for the repugnant conclusion, for example, still works if
‘barely positive welfare level’ is everywhere replaced by ‘welfare level barely
above that of constantly neutral lives’. If the original repugnant conclusion is
repugnant, it should also be repugnant with that replacement: the Z outcome
can differ little from one where everyone’s life is on the verge of being always
worth ending.
Lastly, given the argument about constant additions, we can reduce com-
parisons between outcomes with different population sizes to comparisons
between outcomes with the same population size. For example, consider
Table 4, showing people’s welfare levels, with w (𝓃) being the welfare level
of a constantly neutral life 𝓃 (not necessarily zero, unless we assume the flat-
line analysis).
How do A and B compare? From the constant addition principle and Pareto
indifference, it follows that A and C are equally good. Hence, by transitivity,
A and B compare in the same way that C and B compare. For example,
according to
Same-Number Utilitarianism. Outcome X is at least as good as outcome Y iff total
welfare in X is at least as high as total welfare in Y, provided that X and Y have the same
population size.
Then B is better than C iff
3 × 5 > 10 + 2 × w (𝓃) ,
which, subtracting 3w (𝓃) from both sides, becomes
3 × (5 − w (𝓃)) > 10 − w (𝓃) .
So, in general, outcomes compare according to totals of welfare less
the welfare level of a constantly neutral life. This is a version of critical-
level utilitarianism. Given the flatline analysis of neutrality, w (𝓃) becomes
zero and we get total utilitarianism which simply removes the same-size pro-
viso in same-number utilitarianism. A similar story is true for other same-
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IV OBJECTIONS AND LOOSE ENDS
I will now consider a number of objections and loose ends that arise regarding
the basic argument of the last section, about additions of constantly neutral
lives open on the left. First, doesn’t the argument overgenerate by implying
the contentious claim that a life can be compared with non-existence in terms
of personal value? Secondly, is it even possible to make a life arbitrarily short
in length? And thirdly, can we really make sense of the idea that a sequence
of outcomes with some number of people converges to an outcome with a
different number of people?
IV.1 Comparativism
I argued that adding Zeno with a constantly neutral life to any outcome A is
just as good as not adding him. Recall Table 5.
Table 5. Shortening Zeno’s lifespan
Zeno People in A
A 1 Life 𝓃 Unaffected
A 2 Life 𝓃 cut short at 40 years Unaffected
A 3 Life 𝓃 cut short at 20 years Unaffected
. . . . . . . . .
A — Unaffected
A 1 is therefore equally good as A. But this does not show that A 1 is equally
good for Zeno as A. Hence, the argument establishes
General-Value Comparativism. Outcomes where one does not exist can be com-
parable in terms of general value with outcomes where one does exist.
But not necessarily
Personal-Value Comparativism. Outcomes where one does not exist can be com-
parable in terms of personal value with outcomes where one does exist.25
We might think that we could establish the latter by using
Transfinite Transitivity of Equal Goodness-For. For all value-bearers
X , X 1, X 2, . . ., the sequence X 1, X 2, . . . converges to X, and X 1 is equally good for
one as X 2, X 2 is equally good for one as X 3, . . . , then X 1 is equally good for one as X.
But opponents of personal-value comparativism will presumably think that A,
an outcome where Zeno does not exist, cannot be a bearer of value-for-Zeno.
25 See Broome (1993) for a classic argument against personal-value comparativism, and
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And, so, they will think that it does not fall under the antecedent of transfinite
transitivity of equal goodness-for. By contrast, A does seem to be a bearer of
general value.
The restriction to value-bearers is redundant in the case of ordinary (finite)
transitivity where the antecedent already implies that all of the items at issue
are value-bearers in the relevant sense. This is not true in the case of transfinite
transitivity, since the limit outcome is not mentioned in the antecedent at all.
There we need to add that restriction explicitly.26
IV.2 Divisibility
In the last section, I also assumed that a life can be made arbitrarily short in
length. This is to assume something both about the nature of time and the
nature of life: that there is no smallest interval of time, and that there is no
smallest possible lifespan.
To see that the former is actually needed, suppose that there is a smallest
interval of time, say,  units. Then we cannot make Zeno’s lifespan arbitrarily
close to zero since it cannot go down below  units. Hence, no sequence of
outcomes where Zeno’s life gets shorter and shorter converges to an outcome
where Zeno does not exist at all.
In response, we can say that continuous time is routinely assumed in physics
and that ethics should be no worse off in that respect.27 So, while the possibility
of discrete time is a real challenge, it is not a pressing one.
On the other hand, the possibility that there is a limit on how short a life can
be, biologically or psychologically speaking, is less speculative. Yet it was also
implicitly assumed away in my argument. Luckily, it can be accommodated,
at least to an extent.
To see this, note that there are two ways to read the claim that  units, say,
is a minimum duration of life:
(i) Any possible life lasts at least  units of time.
(ii) Any possible life lasts more than  units of time.
The difference is subtle but important. According to the first, the temporal
interval [0, ] is long enough to fit a life: if something starts at time 0 and
lasts until time  inclusive, it lasts for  units in total. But, according to the
26 Even though we lack a non-question-begging argument for personal-value comparativism,
we have a non-question-begging argument for the conditional: if personal-value comparativism,
then non-existence is just as good for one as existence with a constantly neutral life. Compare
Nebel (2019: 325).
27 Compare, for example, Pruss (2018: 172): ‘Standard formulations of major physics theories
from Newton onwards either model time with the real numbers or model spacetime as a
continuous manifold with local coordinates (. . . ) The continuity involved is essential to the
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second, that is too short. To be a life, something needs to last longer than any
non-life by a positive margin.
The last section’s argument carries over with small changes on the second
reading but fails on the first. To see this, consider Table 6.
Table 6. Shortening Zeno’s lifespan to one day
Zeno People in A
A 1 Life 𝓃, 30,000 days long Unaffected
A 2 Life 𝓃 cut short at 15,000.5 days Unaffected
A 3 Life 𝓃 cut short at 7,500.75 days Unaffected
A 4 Life 𝓃 cut short at 3,750.875 days Unaffected
. . . . . . . . .
A Life 𝓃 cut short at one day Unaffected
Let’s assume, for example, that  units is one day. A 1 is the outcome of
adding Zeno to A with a constantly neutral life𝓃 of 30,000 days, which is about
82 years. Then if in some subsequent outcome Zeno’s lifespan is T days, we
cut it down to 1 + T−12 days in the next. Arguably, the sequence of outcomes
A 1, A 2, . . . converges to A, where Zeno’s life is cut short at exactly the one-day
mark.
On the first reading, Zeno has a life in all outcomes in the sequence as
well as in the limit outcome. Hence, using the strategy of the last section, it
follows, at best, that adding a constantly neutral life is just as good as adding a
constantly neutral life of minimal duration. But, on the second reading, Zeno
does not exist in A. Put differently, ‘life 𝓃 cut short at one day’ does not pick
out a life but perhaps something which could have been a life if it lasted a little
longer. Hence, we can argue as before that adding a constantly neutral life is
just as good as not adding it at all.
So, to mount a successful challenge to the argument of the last section, one
would have to argue not only that there is a minimum duration of life, but also
for a specific reading of ‘minimum duration’. But the two readings seem on a
par, with the second reading having a slight intuitive edge. So, we again have
a real challenge but not a pressing one.
IV.3 Distance metric
But can we even make sense of convergence across population sizes? In some
cases this is intuitive enough. But to improve our grip on it, I will now give a
toy model of closeness and, so, convergence. It is meant as a consistency check,
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In the extant population ethics literature, convergence is sometimes used
in the sense of convergence in welfare profile.28 More precisely, it is often said
that the sequence of outcomes X 1, X 2, . . . converges to outcome X if the
welfare profiles of X 1, X 2, . . . converge to that of X, where a welfare profile is
an n-tuple of real numbers representing the welfare of the n people existing in
a given outcome. This assumes, of course, that welfare can be measured on a
real-valued scale.
Since a welfare profile is a point in a Euclidean n-space, Rn , convergence
between welfare profiles can be fixed by the Euclidean distance, so that the
distance between welfare profiles (w 1, w 2, . . . , w n ) and (u 1, u 2, . . . , u n ) is
given by
√
(w 1 − u 1)2 + (w 2 − u 2)2 + . . . + (w n − u n )2.
For example, on the real plane (R2), the Euclidean distance between two
points is simply the length of a line segment joining them.
But if two outcomes differ in population size, their welfare profiles are
of different dimensions. Hence, their Euclidean distance is undefined, unless
we assume the controversial personal-value comparativism.29 But, for our
purposes, there is an easy fix: include information about lifespans in addition
to welfare levels.
To see how it goes, think of a life as a point in two-dimensional space, the
x-axis giving its length, and the y-axis giving its overall welfare. The space will
look as in Figure 1.
To prop up the last section’s argument, we need to make sense of the idea
that, as someone’s lifespan goes to zero, the whole outcome gets closer to one
where they do not exist. But, recall, we only need to make sense of this for lives
which are left-open. Hence, we can ignore the possibility that someone’s life
could correspond to a point directly on the y-axis (which is therefore dotted).
So, intuitively, if we make someone’s life closer to the y-axis, we will move the
whole outcome closer to one without them. But to get a well-defined distance,
we need to pick a single point on the y-axis as reference. Here it is natural to
pick the origin, (0, 0).
So, for each person, we can now measure the distance to an outcome without
them by simply using the Euclidean distance in a welfare/lifespan space like in
Figure 1. For example, the distance between (0, 0) (representing non-existence)
and (40, 30) (a life of 40 years with welfare 30) is easily calculated to be 50. We
can now aggregate these individual measures into a single measure for whole
outcomes.
28 See Blackorby et al. (2001) and Broome (2003).
29 It would also be unwise to assume it here, since it could make the last section’s argument
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Figure 1. Distance metric.
More precisely, we can define a welfare-lifespan profile to be a (count-
ably infinite) list of pairs of welfare levels and lifespans for each possi-
ble person, including possibly the (0, 0) pair (representing non-existence).
Examples are ((w 1, l1), (w 2, l2), . . .) and ((u 1, k1), (u 2, k2), . . .), with
w 1, w 2, . . . , u 1, u 2, . . . representing welfare levels and l1, l2, . . . , k1, k2, . . .
representing lifespans. Then we can define the distance between their corre-
sponding outcomes to be:
√√√√√
(w 1 − u 1)2 + (l1 − k1)2
+ (w 2 − u 2)2 + (l2 − k2)2
+ . . .
This new formula can easily be verified to be a distance metric. In cases
where population size is finite, it is also always well-defined, since at most a
finite number of its terms will be non-zero. In fixed-population fixed-lifespan
comparisons, it reduces to the Euclidean distance between welfare profiles.
And, lastly, it implies the convergence claims needed for the arguments of the
last section.
This toy model also has no untoward substantive implications. For example,
even though one’s closeness to non-existence is measured from the origin, (0, 0),
it does not follow that non-existence is a bearer of personal value in any sense,
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V PROCREATIVE ASYMMETRY
All arguments in this paper so far were about evaluating outcomes where
different numbers of people exist. I will now consider the issue of choosing
between such outcomes. In this context, transfinite acyclicity becomes more
important than transfinite transitivity. In particular, transfinite acyclicity of strict
worseness rather than strict betterness turns out to be crucial. This asymmetry
between worseness and betterness has significant implications for population
ethics and can lead to a form of weak procreative asymmetry, according to which,
other things equal, there is more reason against adding bad lives than against
failing to add good ones.30
V.1 Asymmetry of transfinite cycles
Since transfinite transitivity/acyclicity are infinitary principles, to see how they
bear on permissible choice, we have to consider choices from infinite sets of
outcomes. But infinite sets of outcomes are notoriously problematic.31 Suppose,
for example, the more money the better and consider {$1, $2, $3, . . .}, the set
of natural-valued dollar amounts, or [$0, $100), the set of real-valued dollar
amounts greater than $0 but strictly less than $100. In either case no outcome is
maximal in the sense of not being worse than any available outcome. A fortiori,
no outcome is best in the sense of being at least as good as any available.
But it is often assumed that, setting deontological considerations aside, one is
permitted to choose all and only maximal outcomes. So, it is puzzling what
one is to choose in these cases.
Here the puzzlement arguably arises because the set of available outcomes,
S, fails to have the property of
Compactness. Every sequence drawn from S has a subsequence which converges to
something in S.
In our examples, the sequence $1, $2, $3, . . . diverges to infinity, so has
no convergent subsequence, and even though the sequence $0, $50, $75,
$87.5, . . . converges to $100, $100 itself is not an available outcome. Since
many of the paradigmatically problematic infinite decision puzzles have to do
with non-compactness, it is reasonable to expect compact sets of outcomes
to be unproblematic when it comes to the existence of maximal (generally:
choiceworthy) outcomes.
30 The procreative asymmetry first appears in Narveson (1973), the label itself being due to
McMahan (1981). In its stronger form it says that, other things equal, there is some reason against
adding bad lives but no reason against failing to add good ones. A version of the weak procreative
asymmetry is discussed in McMahan (2009).
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Hence, it is important news that transfinite cycles of strict worseness rule out
the existence of maximal elements in compact sets. By contrast, transfinite
cycles of strict betterness do not need to do so.
For example, the former sort of cycle can arise if adding constantly bad lives
is sometimes better than not adding them (a potential implication of average
utilitarianism given the flatline analysis of neutrality). To see this, suppose we
add Zeno with a constantly bad life 𝒷 to some antecedent outcome A and then
progressively halve his lifespan.
Table 7. Transfinite cycle of strict worseness
Zeno People in A
A 1 Life 𝒷 Unaffected
A 2 Life 𝒷 cut short at 40 years Unaffected
A 3 Life 𝒷 cut short at 20 years Unaffected
. . . . . . . . .
A — Unaffected
If adding Zeno with 𝒷 is better than not adding him, then, with strong
Pareto, we get the following transfinite cycle of strict worseness:
A ≺ A 1 ≺ A 2 ≺ . . . → A .
Let S = {A , A 1, A 2, . . .}. No outcome is maximal in S, as no outcome
of the form A i can be maximal, since it is worse than A i+1, and A cannot be
maximal either, since it is worse than A 1. Yet S is easily verified to be compact.
A mirror image of this situation can arise if adding constantly good lives is
sometimes worse than not adding them (a potential implication of critical-level
utilitarianism given the flatline analysis of neutrality). In Table 8, is some
constantly good life.
Table 8. Transfinite cycle of strict betterness
Zeno People in A
B1 Life Unaffected
B2 Life cut short at 40 years Unaffected
B3 Life cut short at 20 years Unaffected
. . . . . . . . .
B — Unaffected
If adding Zeno with is worse than not adding him, then, with strong
Pareto, we get the following transfinite cycle of strict betterness:
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Let S = {B, B1, B2, . . .}. If we assume ordinary (finite) transitivity, S
does have a maximal, even best, outcome, namely, B. Hence, we see that
the two sorts of transfinite cycles (and the theories that can generate them)
have different implications for the possibility of maximizing choice, even from
compact sets.32
V.2 Asymmetry of pumpability
This difference maps on to whether the two sorts of transfinite cycles make one
liable to money pumps. We say that an agent is liable to forcing money pumps if in
some possible situation they have to make a series of actions so that they end up
paying some cost even though an otherwise identical costless alternative could
also be obtained, and that they are liable to non-forcing money pumps if in some
possible situation they might but perhaps do not have to make such a series of
actions.33
We can leave the nature of this cost open. It need not be monetary but
can instead be denominated in some other relevant currency. And it need not
fall on the agent alone but can instead be spread to some or all of the people
involved. The basic idea behind money-pump arguments is that, whatever
the cost is, one’s theory would not tell one to pay it in advance. Hence, if,
together with the structure of one’s decision problem, following one’s theory
means that one ends up paying anyway, then the theory is self-defeating in an
objectionable manner.34
Let’s start with finite cycles. Suppose that A is worse than B, which is worse
than C, which is worse than A, and consider the decision tree in Figure 2
where squares represent the agent’s choices, leading to further choices or to
final outcomes.35
Here we offer the agent a choice from A, B, C, and, whatever they choose, we
give them a chance to switch to the next-better outcome for a small payment.
The claim is that the agent, if guided by value, will end up paying no matter
what (as indicated by the arrows). Why?
First, the agent has to choose B over A. This follows if the agent is guided
by value in a minimal way, namely, in pairwise choices. But then, since B is
32 Critical-band utilitarianism (as in Blackorby et al. 2005: 219–22) implies that adding a good
life might be incomparable with not adding it, while some person-affecting views (as in Heyd
1988 and Bader ms-b) imply this about bad lives, too. These views do not lead to transfinite cycles,
but at worst to transfinite intransitivities. They therefore avoid the most worrisome problems of
average and critical-level utilitarianism discussed in this section.
33 The distinction appears in Gustafsson & Espinoza (2010).
34 Liability to money pumps is therefore not merely a sign of imprudence. But this is not the
place for a full defence of money-pump arguments in ethics. For a recent sympathetic discussion,
see Gustafsson (2015).
35 This decision tree is due to Cantwell (2003: 389) and also employed by Gustafsson (2015:
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Figure 2. Finite money pump.
strictly better than A, the agent should choose B even at some small cost ε.
Similarly for C and B, and A and C. Hence, they have to go down at all nodes
following the initial one.
Secondly, the agent is permitted to do something at the initial node. From
that node’s vantage point there are only finitely many outcomes that can be
obtained. And, the argument goes, finite sets of outcomes never present moral
dilemmas. This is plausible so long as deontological considerations are set
aside.36 So, the agent is permitted to embark on a plan to get one of the
obtainable outcomes.
The agent is therefore permitted to go somewhere from the initial node but
then they have to go down. Hence, in two moves, the agent is required to pay
for something they could have had for free. This is a forcing money pump.
Since this is objectionably self-defeating, we can conclude that strict worseness
cannot be cyclic after all.37
Now consider an infinite version of this pump, as in Figure 3, directed
against the transfinite cycle of strict worseness from Table 7.
Figure 3. Transfinite money pump.
36 Compare Kreps’s (2013: 3) assumption of finite non-emptiness in rational choice theory.
37 There are ways to get around this pump, for example, by adopting resolute choice. See
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Here we offer the agent a choice between outcomes A , A 1, A 2, . . ., and,
whatever they choose, we give them a chance to switch to the next-better
outcome for a small payment.38 The claim is, again, that the agent (an average
utilitarian, say), if guided by value, will end up paying no matter what.
The first step is like before (this time backed up by strong Pareto). The second
step appeals not to the claim that finite sets never present moral dilemmas,
but instead to the claim that compact sets do not. While choice from infinite
sets of outcomes might be hard, we saw above that many paradigmatic infinite
decision puzzles are due to non-compactness. Hence, if we demand choice to
be possible from finite sets, we should be happy to demand it from infinite
compact sets.39 In the current example, it also does not seem like the agent’s
initial choice is a moral dilemma: they are effectively asked whether to add
Zeno with a constantly bad life and, if so, how long to make it.
Hence, in two moves, the agent is again required to pay for something they
could have had for free. This is a forcing money pump. If we should reject
cycles of strict worseness in response to the original pump, we should reject
transfinite cycles of strict worseness here, too.
By contrast, the transfinite cycle of strict betterness from Table 8 does not
lead to trouble in the same sort of pump. To see this, consider Figure 4.
Figure 4. Failed transfinite money pump.
In this case, the agent should arguably end up paying ε for B, as B is best in
{B, B1, B2, . . .}. Since B is not available for free anyway, the agent does not
end up paying for something they could have had for free. And if B were also
freely available, say, directly from the initial node, the agent should arguably
go for that free B.40
38 The side payments converge to zero to ensure compactness of the set of obtainable out-
comes. It is not necessary that they decrease geometrically.
39 Compactness is routinely assumed in economics in this context, see Kreps (2013: 1–29).
And, in mathematics, compactness is seen as a generalization of finiteness, as per Hermann
Weyl’s apocryphal gloss on one of its many equivalent formulations: ‘if a city is compact, it can
be guarded by a finite number of arbitrarily near-sighted policemen’; see Hewitt (1960).
40 This does not, strictly speaking, show that no pump is available against a transfinite cycle
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V.3 Asymmetry of procreation
What makes one liable to money pumps in this context is not the transfinite
cycle of strict worseness itself but rather the transfinitely cyclic pattern of
pairwise choices it generates. And that pattern can arise independently if, for
example, adding bad lives is sometimes permissible. By contrast, it does not
immediately arise if not adding good lives is sometimes permissible.
To get the argument going, we need one extra plausible assumption, namely,
that if adding a bad life is permissible, then adding an equally good but constantly
bad life is just as permissible. Without loss of generality, then, suppose that it
is permissible to add Zeno with constantly bad life 𝒷 to some antecedent
outcome A, as in Table 7.
Now consider the corresponding decision tree in Figure 3 again. The claim
is that if the agent is allowed to add Zeno with 𝒷 to A, then they might end up
paying no matter what. (If they are required to add him, then they have to pay.)
The first step is that the agent may go down at all nodes following the
initial node. First, the agent should go down at nodes 2, 3, 4, . . . because
that is at least as good for all and better for some. This can be backed up by
strong Pareto, this time deontically construed. Put differently, it is worth paying
something to make Zeno’s miserable life twice as short as it would otherwise
be. And, second, it arguably follows from our hypothesis that it is permissible
to add Zeno with 𝒷 to A that the agent may go down at node 1 as well.41
The next step is the same as before: either compact sets present no moral
dilemmas or this particular choice is not a moral dilemma.
Hence, the agent is permitted (at worst, required) to end up paying for
something they could have had for free. This is a money pump (at worst, a
forcing one).
By contrast, the permission not to add a good life does not land our agent
in trouble in the same way. This can be seen by considering the decision tree
in Figure 4 again, on the supposition that the agent is permitted not to add
Zeno with constantly good life . There the agent is arguably still be permitted
to end up with B − ε, hence avoiding a money pump.
If arguments in the first part of this paper, based on principles of transfinite
transitivity, are sound, then adding a bad life and not adding a good life are
both suboptimal: they make things worse. What we can conclude from this
section, however, is that there is a special reason against adding bad lives
which does not speak against not adding good lives. That is, the permission
to do the former can make one liable to money pumps in a way in which
41 If, on balance, one’s reasons favour adding Zeno, then that will be true if adding Zeno
comes at a small cost. If, on balance, one’s reasons favour adding and not adding equally, then
we can arrange things so that one’s reasons favour adding Zeno more (by making his life slightly
better, say). And if the balance of reasons fails to decide, then, plausibly, making Zeno’s creation
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the permission to do the latter does not. Hence, we get a form of the weak
procreative asymmetry: there is more reason against adding bad lives than
against failing to add good lives, at least other things being equal. Importantly,
this asymmetry at the level of choice can be combined with a fully symmetric
picture at the level of value.42
VI CONTINUITY
Transfinite transitivity and acyclicity principles are topological principles in the
sense that they make an essential reference to the topology of the domain of eval-
uation such as facts about convergence and closeness. To forestall confusion, it
is important to distinguish them from some better-known topological princi-
ples, namely, continuity principles. This comparison also serves to underscore
the former’s appeal.43
I will focus on
Transfinite Transitivity of Weak Worseness. For all value-bearers X , X 1, X 2, . . .,
if the sequence X 1, X 2, . . . converges to X, and X 1 is at least as bad as X 2, X 2 is at least
as bad as X 3, . . . , then X 1 is at least as bad as X.
Put differently: for all value-bearers X , X 1, X 2, . . .,
X 1, X 2, . . . → X and X i  X i+1, for all i, implies X 1  X .
Contrast this with
Continuity of Weak Worseness. For all value-bearers Y, X , X 1, X 2, . . ., if the se-
quence X 1, X 2, . . . converges to X, and Y is at least as bad as X 1, Y is at least as bad as
X 2, . . . , then Y is at least as bad as X.
Put differently: for all value-bearers Y, X , X 1, X 2, . . .,
X 1, X 2, . . . → X and Y  X i, for all i, imply Y  X .44
The idea is that value comparisons (here: weak worseness) are preserved in
the limit.
Continuity and transfinite transitivity differ in two ways. First, the
X 1, X 2, . . . sequence has to be -ordered for transfinite transitivity but not
42 This account of the asymmetry relies on an intrinsic asymmetry between infinite chains of
worseness and betterness. It is therefore not ad hoc, unlike many accounts surveyed in Roberts
(2011). It also does not rely on substantive deontological resources. It is close in spirit, and inspired
by, the account in Bader (forthcoming), although Bader does not appeal to transfinite cycles nor
money pumps but instead to principles of universalizability.
43 Another principle of this sort is hypersensitivity avoidance, discussed in Pummer (2019).
44 In metric spaces, this is the same as the set {Z : Y  Z} being closed for all value-bearers
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for continuity. Secondly, in the case of transfinite transitivity but not conti-
nuity, the Y against which members of the sequence are compared has to be
the sequence’s first member. So, it is easy to see that, given ordinary transi-
tivity, continuity implies transfinite transitivity.45 Yet the converse fails in an
interesting way, since transfinite transitivity, unlike continuity, can accommo-
date lexical value relations.46
To see this, let’s use Thomas’s (2018: 813) toy example of total lexical utilitar-
ianism. To introduce it, first assume that only two things matter for personal
value: love and money. We will think of them as real-valued quantities. Then
according to
Total Lexical Utilitarianism. Outcome X is at least as good as outcome Y iff total
love in X is greater than total love in Y, or they are equal and total money in X is at least
as great as total money in Y.
So, each life and each outcome maps to a point of a two-dimensional space,
with total quantities of love on the x-axis and of money on the y-axis. The
horizontal dimension is lexically superior. Since we are in a two-dimensional
space, let’s assume that the relevant notion of convergence between outcomes
is fixed by the Euclidean distance.
It is easy to see that all this implies that Thomas’s toy theory violates
continuity of weak worseness, as in Table 9.47
Table 9. Discontinuity
Zeno (love, money) Other people
A 1 (80, 0) Unaffected
A 2 (40, 0) Unaffected
A 3 (20, 0) Unaffected
. . . . . . . . .
A (0, 0) Unaffected
B (0,100) Unaffected
45 Compare Proposition 3.6 in Smith (1974). Bartha et al. (2014: 641–2, 657–8) also discuss
the connection between principles they call ‘transfinite transitivity’ and ‘continuity’. But by
‘continuity’ they mean continuity of the numerical representation of the underlying binary relation.
As Luce & Suppes (1965: 265) indicate, continuity of the binary relation is the more fundamental
notion.
46 On lexicality, see Debreu (1954). Transfinite transitivity can also accommodate some in-
complete value relations that continuity cannot. On incompleteness and continuity, see Aumann
(1962: 450–3).
47 Thomas (2018: fn. 18) says otherwise because he assumes the discrete topology rather than
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In this example, Zeno’s money-deprived life is diminishing in terms of love
over the sequence A 1, A 2, . . .. But so long as Zeno’s life holds some love, each
of these outcomes is better than B, where he has no love but some money.
Yet the sequence A 1, A 2, . . . converges to A, where Zeno has no love and no
money, which is therefore worse than B.
This is a violation of continuity of weak worseness but not transfinite transi-
tivity of weak worseness. For the latter we would need not only the fact that B
is worse than A 1 without being at least as bad as A, but also that all outcomes
in the sequence A 1, A 2, . . . are at least as bad as the next, which we do not
have in this case.
Thus, while proponents of lexical views in population ethics have reasons
to be wary of topological principles like continuity, they have no immediate
reason to be wary of transfinite transitivity principles. Therefore, framing
this paper in terms of transfinite transitivity has a real advantage, besides
pumping transitivity-friendly intuitions, even though, logically speaking, much
of it would work if we used continuity principles instead.48
VII CONCLUSION
This paper introduced and explained infinite extensions of transitivity and
acyclicity in the context of population ethics. It showed how to use these
principles (given a suitable notion of convergence or closeness) to establish
that adding constantly neutral lives is just as good as not adding them, adding
constantly good lives is better, and adding constantly bad lives is worse. These
arguments have important implications for population ethics: ruling out a
number of theories, feeding into arguments for the repugnant conclusion,
and reducing different-number comparisons to same-number comparisons.
It also addressed a number of challenges to these arguments: the issue of
personal-value comparativism, the possibility of minimal quanta of time and
life, and provided a toy model of convergence across population sizes. The
paper also uncovered an asymmetry between infinite chains of betterness and
worseness which leads to an asymmetry in liability to money pumps and to an
asymmetry in the ethics of procreation. Transfinite transitivity and acyclicity
were also argued to be more appealing than standard topological principles of
continuity.49
48 This is especially true as transfinite transitivity of equal goodness happens to be equivalent
to continuity of equal goodness. Compare Smith (1974: 189).
49 I would like to thank Michal Masny, Elliott Thornley, Todd Karhu, Aidan Penn, Jack
Kelly, Tushar Menon, Alex Voorhoeve, Andreas Mogensen, and two anonymous referees for this
journal. Special thanks to Ralf Bader, Teru Thomas, Theron Pummer, and Tomi Francis who
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